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E-mail address: tingwei01@gmail.comChina has moved rapidly from a socialist planned economy to a market economy. As a
result, many enterprises in China are seeking talented top management to increase their
performance and decrease their default risk. Studies abound regarding top management
turnover and its relationship with ﬁrm performance, however, few studies have connected
top management turnover with ﬁrm default risk. In China, a market with extensive ﬁnan-
cial fraud, ﬁrm default risk is an important factor and thus we explore this relationship in
the Chinese securities market. Our results indicate that ﬁrms with higher default risk are
more likely to change their top management in the next ﬁnancial reporting period. In addi-
tion, following changes in top management, such ﬁrms default less than other companies.
 2011 China Journal of Accounting Research. Founded by Sun Yat-sen University and City
University of Hong Kong. Production and hosting by Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.1. Introduction
China has sustained a rapid rate of economic growth since the start of its economic reforms. The trials and tribulations of
the reform process have been well documented (Cao et al., 1999; Gao, 1996; Groves et al., 1994; Lin and Zhu, 2001) and anal-
ysis of the effectiveness of these reforms has begun to appear in the literature (Allen et al., 2005). Following this trend, many
academic articles have focused on China, examining topics such as the effect of foreign direct investment (Pingyao, 2002; Liu
et al., 2002), the volatility of the stock market (Xu and Chen, 2001; Yeh and Lee, 2000), the effect of trading strategies (Kang
et al., 2002) and the determinants of stock returns in the Chinese market (Bailey et al., 2003).
One of the most important policies for the Chinese securities market has been China’s rapid transformation from a socia-
list planned economy into a market economy. Many state-owned enterprises (SOEs) are listed on the Chinese securities mar-
ket and the majority shareholders of such ﬁrms are the Chinese government, which has relatively little experience in
increasing ﬁrm performance. Accordingly, many studies have suggested that developing an improved system of managerial
resource allocation that is responsive to market forces is important to China’s economic reform (Groves et al., 1995). Groves
et al. (1995) found that poor performing ﬁrms were more likely to select a new manager by auction, were required to post anal of Accounting Research. Founded by Sun Yat-sen University and City University of Hong Kong.
served.
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been ﬁred for poor performance and higher default risk. They conclude that top management plays an important role in
Chinese enterprises. Many empirical studies link top management turnover to ﬁrm performance and provide evidence to
show that the likelihood of management turnover is negatively related to ﬁrm performance (Coughlan and Schmidt,
1985; Warner et al., 1988; Weisbach, 1988). Stiglitz and Weiss (1983) explored the termination of managers’ contracts
and found that the probability of top management turnover depends on current and past relative performance. Warner
et al. (1988) also found that ﬁrms with low stock returns are more likely to change their top management. Coughlan and
Schmidt (1985), Kim (1996) and Weisbach (1988) also report similar results.
Although, several studies have explored the relationship between top management turnover and ﬁrm performance, few
have explored the relationship between top management turnover and the probability of ﬁrm default. Recently, many noto-
rious accounting scandals, such as Enron and WorldCom, have forced the public to pay more attention to ﬁrm default risk.
Corporate scandals in emerging markets are even more serious. In China, Sun and Zhang (2006) point out that about 20% of
publicly listed ﬁrms have been convicted by the China Securities Regulations Committee (CSRC) for serious fraud or other
scandals since the Chinese stock market was established in the early 1990s. Numerous cases of ﬁnancial fraud have occurred
recently in China, such as those involving the Chang An Information Industry Company and the Yuan Hua Company. Accord-
ingly, in this study we explore the relationship between top management turnover and the probability of ﬁrm default in the
biggest emerging market, China, which has extensive fraud and few mature securities regulations to protect investors.
In addition to ﬁnding that poor performing ﬁrms are more likely to have a new manager, many studies show that after
replacing top management there is a potential improvement in ﬁrm performance, and subsequently ﬁrm value. Denis and
Denis (1995) and Huson et al. (2004) document a substantial improvement in ﬁrm performance after the incumbent top
management were removed following poor ﬁrm performance. Therefore, in our study we also assess the effect of replacing
top management on ﬁrm performance.
Our study makes several contributions to the literature in this ﬁeld. First, we provide evidence of the relationship be-
tween top management turnover and ﬁrm default risk, thus complementing the ﬁndings of prior studies. Second, we exam-
ine ﬁrms listed on the Chinese stock market to explore such relationships. Companies in emerging securities markets have
higher default risk, therefore investors look for good top management to improve ﬁrm performance and reduce default risk.
Accordingly, in this study we explore whether top management can effectively control ﬁrm default risk. Finally, we explore
whether the probability of default decreases following the removal of the incumbent top management. This provides evi-
dence regarding whether the appointment of newmanagement is likely to improve ﬁrm performance. The empirical ﬁndings
in this study should help investors to make appropriate investment decisions.
We use a random effects panel regression model rather than ordinary least squares (OLS) estimation in this study, be-
cause the panel regression model is able to supply more accurate inferences for the parameters and reduce any collinearity
that may exist amongst the explanatory variables. Our results show that there is a greater prior risk of default when ﬁrms
replace top management. Furthermore, after ﬁrms replace their top management, the probability of ﬁrm default is lower
than for other companies.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the literature review and develops our hypotheses.
Section 3 describes the data sources and empirical methodology. Section 4 provides descriptive statistics and presents the
empirical results and analysis. The ﬁnal section summarizes the conclusions.2. Literature review and hypothesis development
2.1. Default risk and fraud
Dechow et al. (1996) and Johnstone (2000) indicate that ﬁrms with higher default risk have more incentive to use discre-
tionary accruals to manipulate their ﬁnancial statements, which is a type of fraud. In addition, many studies ﬁnd that ﬁrms
with a lower credit rating have higher default risk, thus they have more motivation to manipulate their ﬁnancial statements
(Bhojraj and Sengupta, 2003; Klock et al., 2005). Thus, ﬁrms facing higher default risk tend to use fraud to hide their default
risk, and/or ﬁrms that commit fraud tend to go bankrupt once their fraud is detected, as happened in the case of Enron.
DeAngelo et al. (1994) ﬁnd that managers use accounting choices primarily to reﬂect their ﬁrms’ ﬁnancial difﬁculties,
rather than to attempt to inﬂate income. DeFond and Jiambalvo (1994) indicate that managers of ﬁrms that are approaching
default respond with income-increasing accounting changes. In addition, many studies provide evidence that if a ﬁrm’s cov-
enant is violated, the lender has more opportunity to evaluate the borrower’s performance. The managers of such ﬁrms then
have more incentive to commit fraud and manipulate ﬁnancial statements (Smith, 1993; Chen and Wei, 1993; Gopalakrish-
nan and Parkash, 1995; Dichev and Skinner, 2002). In summary, ﬁrms facing higher default risk tend to use fraud (such as
manipulating their ﬁnancial statements) to hide their high default risk.2.2. CEO replacement and the probability of default
Many studies indicate that management turnover is negatively related to past ﬁrm performance (Coughlan and Schmidt,
1985; Warner et al., 1988; Weisbach, 1988; Gilson, 1989; Gilson and Vetsuypens, 1993). Desai et al. (2004) show that the
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it may beneﬁt the ﬁrm to initiate a change in their top management. This would explain why boards are prone to replacing
managers following an increase in a ﬁrm’s probability of default.
Sun and Zhang (2006) examine management turnover associated with fraud and ﬁnd that ﬁrms associated with fraud
have higher management turnover than a matched sample of non-fraud ﬁrms. Gilson (1989) investigated top management
turnover in ﬁnancially distressed ﬁrms and found that 52% of ﬁrms with top management turnover in the investigative year
are either in default on their debt or are bankrupt. Similar results are also reported by Ofek (1993) and Gilson (1989).
Although, these studies ﬁnd that top management turnover is closely related to bankruptcy, they only focus on bankrupt
or fraudulent ﬁrms. For investors or debt holders it is more important to be able to accurately predict the probability of ﬁrm
default. However, previous studies do not provide information that will help investors or debt holders to understand the
relationship between top management turnover and the probability of default. In addition, many studies indicate that fraud
increases a ﬁrm’s default risk (Haldeman, 2006; Vassalou and Xing, 2004). In this study, we use a KMVmodel to estimate the
probability of default for all ﬁrms, thus allowing us to explore more accurately the relationship between top management
turnover and ﬁrm default risk. Following Sun and Zhang (2006) and Gilson (1989), we predict that there will be a positive
correlation between top management turnover and the risk of bankruptcy for a ﬁrm. Thus, our ﬁrst hypothesis is as follows:
Hypothesis 1. A positive relationship exists between ﬁrm default risk and top management turnover.
If the replacement of top management leads to lower default risk, the probability of default should decrease with higher
levels of top management turnover. Accordingly, we propose our second hypothesis as follows:
Hypothesis 2. Following the replacement of top management, the probability of default decreases.3. Data and methodology
3.1. Data description
Our investigation of the relationship between top management turnover and the probability of ﬁrm default is based on
data obtained from the Chinese Stock Market and Accounting Research (CSMAR) database. This sample is comprised of all
publicly listed enterprises on the Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges. As the China Securities Regulatory Commission
(CSRC) has required all publicly listed ﬁrms on these stock markets to compile their corporate governance data since 2001,
our sample covers the ﬁve-year period from 2001 to 2005.
Only those companies which conform to our selection criteria are used in our analysis. First, we include only ﬁrms that
have their ﬁnancial year-end in December. This ensures that the information obtained from ﬁnancial statements is available
each year. Second, we select only those ﬁrms for which there is complete data (book value of total debt and assets, market
value of equity, stock price volatility, etc.) for the ﬁnancial years 2001 to 2005, to fully satisfy the computation requirements
of the KMV model. This selection process yields a total of 433 ﬁrms and 2165 ﬁrm-year observations.
3.2. Empirical models
We employ a multivariate random effects balanced panel regression model to examine the relationship between top
management turnover and default risk for publicly listed ﬁrms in China. We begin by constructing an annual time series
model of top management turnover and corporate default risk using the KMV model to assess the probability of default.
The KMV model calculates the actual probability of default based on the option pricing theory of Black and Scholes
(1973) and Merton (1974). The computation of ‘expected default frequency’ (EDF) is based on the company’s capital struc-
ture, volatility of its asset returns and current asset value. The process of deriving EDF is described in Appendix A.
Guided by related theories drawn from the aforementioned studies, the control variables comprise the debt ratio, return
on assets, natural logarithm of total assets, a dummy variable indicating the same person occupies both the chairman and
CEO positions, and the number of board directors. Calendar year dummy variables are also included to control for time ef-
fects on default risk. To explore H1, we use the probability of ‘‘prior’’ ﬁrm default in model (1) to explore the relationship
between top management turnover and the probability of ﬁrm default. Model (1) is described as follows:RISKit1 ¼ a0 þ a1CEOCHANGEit þ a2CEOCHANGEit1 þ a3DEBTit þ a4ROAit þ a5LNASSETit þ a6SAME DIRit
þ a7DIRECTit þ a8Y02it þ a9Y03it þ a10Y04it þ a11Y05it þ eit ð1ÞTo explore H2, we use the probability of ‘‘subsequent’’ ﬁrm default in model (2) to explore whether the probability of ﬁrm
default decreases following the replacement of top management. Model (2) is described as follows:RISKitþ1 ¼ a0 þ b1CEOCHANGEitþ1 þ b2CEOCHANGEit þ b3DEBTit þ b4ROAit þ b5LNASSETit þ b6SAME DIRit
þ b7DIRECTit þ b8Y02it þ b9Y03it þ b10Y04it þ b11Y05it þ eit ð2Þ
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change in their top management in year t; DEBTit is the ith ﬁrm’s debt ratio in year t; ROAit indicates the ith ﬁrm’s return on
assets in year t; LNASSETit expresses the ith ﬁrm’s natural logarithm of total assets in year t; SAME_DIRit is a dummy variable
that takes the value of one if the same person occupies both the chairman and CEO positions in the ith ﬁrm in year t; DIRECTit
indicates the size of the board of directors in the ith ﬁrm in year t; Y02it, Y03it and Y04it, Y05it, are (0,1) dummy variables
controlling for the effects of calendar years; and eit is the error term of the model for the ith ﬁrm in year t.
3.3. Predictions
To investigate the relationship between top management turnover and the probability of ﬁrm default, we use RISKit1 as
the dependent variable in model (1). The coefﬁcients for subsequent management turnover, CEOCHANGEit, and current man-
agement turnover, CEOCHANGEit1, capture the connection between the probability of default and future and current man-
agement turnover. A positive coefﬁcient on CEOCHANGEit indicates that ﬁrms with a higher probability of default are more
likely to change their top management in the future. A positive coefﬁcient on CEOCHANGEit1 indicates that ﬁrms with a
higher probability of default are more likely to change their top management in the same period.
In model (2) we use RISKit+1 as the dependent variable. The coefﬁcients for current management turnover, CEOCHANGEit+1,
and prior management turnover, CEOCHANGEit, capture the connection between future and current management turnover
and the probability of default. A negative coefﬁcient on CEOCHANGEit+1 indicates that when ﬁrms change their top manage-
ment the probability of default decreases in the same period. A negative coefﬁcient on CEOCHANGEit indicates that when
ﬁrms change their top management the probability of default decreases in the next period.
We include the debt ratio (DEBTit), operating performance (ROAit), ﬁrm size (LNASSETit), the same chairman and CEO (SA-
ME_DIRit), and the number of directors (DIRECTit) as control variables in the model. According to Carey and Simnett (2006)
and Vasiliou et al. (2003), ﬁrms with a high probability of default have more debt. We therefore predict that the coefﬁcient
on DEBTit1 is positive. Vasiliou et al. (2003) found that ﬁrms with higher proﬁtability ratios tend to amass less debt than
ﬁrms that do not generate high proﬁts. We therefore infer that default risk will be lower when the proﬁtability of ﬁrms is
higher and the coefﬁcient on ROA is expected to be negative. Many studies use total assets as a proxy for ﬁrm size. Warner
(1977) and Bradbury and Lloyd (1994) reveal a strong negative relationship between default risk and ﬁrm size. Thus, we ex-
pect the coefﬁcient on LNASSETit to be negative.
Jensen (1993) suggests that the dual appointment of chairman and CEO gives too much power to the individual and this
can make it easier to reach a decision that may result in fraudulent actions. Hence, we predict that the coefﬁcient on
SAME_DIRit is positive. Jensen (1993) argues that large corporate boards are less effective and CEOs ﬁnd it easier to control
them. In support of this notion, Yermack (1996) found that ﬁrms with small boards have superior ﬁnancial performance.
However, Uzun et al. (2004) found that board size has no association with corporate fraud. Therefore, the evidence is mixed
and we make no prediction for the coefﬁcient on DIRECTit.
4. Empirical results and analysis
4.1. Summary statistics
Our sample comprises 433 ﬁrms, with a total of 2165 ﬁrm-year observations from 2001 to 2005. Table 1a presents the
descriptive statistics for the pooled sample of all ﬁrm-year observations. From Table 1a, we ﬁnd that the mean ﬁrm’s prob-
ability of default (RISK) is 0.0038. The mean of DEBT is 0.5672, which is similar to the ﬁnding of Zhu (2005), and is higher than
for countries with a well developed securities environment, such as the U.S. On average, ROA is 0.0166 and the logarithm of
total assets is 0.1012. The average of SAME_DIR is 14.3051, thus more than 14% of companies on China’s stock market have
the same person occupying both the chairman and CEO positions. The mean of DIRECT is 9.742, thus the average board of
directors consists of 9.742 directors.Table 1a
Summary descriptive statistics (N = 2165).
Variablea Mean Std. Dev. Median
RISKit 0.0038 0.0556 7.90E-09
DEBTit 0.5672 0.3932 0.5487
ROAit 0.0166 0.1117 0.0278
LNASSETit 0.1012 0.3016 0.0000
SAME_DIRit 14.3051 0.9321 14.2877
DIRECTit 9.6873 2.2179 9.0000
a RISKit is the ith ﬁrm’s default risk computed from the KMV model in year t, DEBTit is the ith ﬁrm’s debt
ratio in year t, ROAit indicates the ith ﬁrm’s return on assets in year t, LNASSETit expresses the ith ﬁrm’s log
total assets in year t, SAME_DIRit is a dummy variable taking the value one if the chairman and CEO positions
are held by the same person in the ith ﬁrm in year t, DIRECTit indicates the size of the board of directors in the
ith ﬁrm in year t.
Table 1b
Summary descriptive statistics for replacement of top management.
Variablea No replacement of top management in year t (1367) Replacement of top management in year t (798)
Meanb Std. Dev. Median Mean Std. Dev. Median
RISKit 0.0033 0.0518 7.27E-09 0.0047 0.0615 1.08E-08
RISKit1 0.0022** 0.0316 7.52E-10 0.0070 0.0726 2.60E-09
DEBTit 0.5553* 0.3841 0.5391 0.5875 0.4078 0.5607
ROAit 0.0254*** 0.1010 0.0297 0.0015 0.1267 0.0224
LNASSETit 14.3797*** 0.9018 14.3735 14.1772 0.9691 14.1193
SAME_DIRit 0.1075 0.3099 0.0000 0.0902 0.2867 0.0000
DIRECTit 9.7242 2.2152 9.0000 9.6241 2.2226 9.0000
a RISKit is the ith ﬁrm’s default risk computed from the KMVmodel in year t, DEBTit is the ith ﬁrm’s debt ratio in year t, ROAit indicates the ith ﬁrm’s return
on assets in year t, LNASSETit expresses the ith ﬁrm’s log total assets in year t, SAME_DIRit is a dummy variable taking the value one if the chairman and CEO
positions are held by the same person in the ith ﬁrm in year t, DIRECTit indicates the size of the board of directors in the ith ﬁrm in year t.
b The two-tailed t-test was adopted to examine the means according to the two different groups.
* Indicates signiﬁcance at the 10% level.
** Indicates signiﬁcance at the 5% level.
*** Indicates signiﬁcance at the 1% level.
Table 1c
Summary risk descriptive statistics after replacement of top management.
Variablea No replacement of top management in year t-1 (1333) Replacement of top management in year t  1 (832)
Mean Std. Dev. Median Mean Std. Dev. Median
RISKit 0.0043 0.0593 2.18E-08 0.0030 0.0491 3.64E-09
RISKit1 0.0038 0.0488 1.21E-09 0.0043 0.0538 1.40E-09
a RISKit is the ith ﬁrm’s default risk computed from the KMV model in year t.
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groups based on whether or not ﬁrms replaced their top management in the current year t. Table 1b displays the summary
descriptive statistics for the replacement of top management. The results show that there is no signiﬁcant difference in the
current default risk (RISKit) of the two groups. The mean prior default risk (RISKit1) is signiﬁcantly higher for ﬁrms that re-
placed their top management in year t. That is, ﬁrms with higher default risk are more likely to change their top management
in the next period but not in the current period. In addition, ﬁrms that change their top management are also associated with
worse debt contract conditions (higher DEBTit), lower performance (lower ROAit) and smaller size (lower LNASSETit). In
Table 1c we explore whether the probability of default changes following a change in top management. The results show
no signiﬁcant differences between the two groups. Therefore, a ﬁrm’s risk of default may not be mitigated by a change in
top management.4.2. Empirical analysis
The empirical results exploring the relationship between top management turnover and the probability of ﬁrm default, as
presented in model (1), are shown in Table 2. The coefﬁcient estimates of the balanced panel multivariate regression model
use the 2165 ﬁrm-year observations.
After controlling for all other variables, the estimated coefﬁcient of CEOCHANGEit is positive and statistically signiﬁcant at
the 5% level, but the estimated coefﬁcient of CEOCHANGEit1 is not statistically signiﬁcant. These results indicate that ﬁrms
with a higher risk of bankruptcy have an increased motive to replace top management in the next period but not the current
period, thereby providing evidence in partial support of Hypothesis 1, in accordance with Sun and Zhang (2006) and Gilson
(1989).
The coefﬁcient of DEBT is positive and statistically signiﬁcant at the 1% level, implying that ﬁrms with poor solvency have
a higher probability of default; this is in line with the ﬁndings of Opler and Titman (1994). The effect of ROA on default risk is
negative and statistically signiﬁcant at the 1% level, indicating that as ﬁrm operational performance increases, there is a cor-
responding reduction in default risk. This is consistent with Vasiliou et al. (2003). The inﬂuence of ﬁrm size on bankruptcy is
negative and statistically signiﬁcant at the 1% level, which suggests the probability of default is lower for larger ﬁrms, in
agreement with the ﬁndings of Jeanblanc and Rutkowski (2000).
We also investigate whether the probability of a ﬁrm defaulting decreases following the replacement of top management.
In this model, we use the probability of subsequent default as the dependent variable as presented in model (2). The empir-
ical results are provided in Table 3.
Table 3
Regression results for top management turnover and ﬁrms’ subsequent default risk (N = 2355). RISKitþ1 ¼ a0 þ b1CEOCHANGEitþ1þ
b2CEOCHANGEit þ b3DEBTit þ b4ROAit þ b5LNASSETit þ b6SAME DIRit þ b7DIRECTit þ b8Y02it þ b9Y03it þ b10Y04it þ b11Y05it þ eit .
Variablesa Predicted sign Coeff.b t-statistic
Constant 0.023 1.194
CEOCHANGEit+1  0.001 0.479
CEOCHANGEit  0.005⁄⁄⁄ 2.748
DEBTit + 0.107⁄⁄⁄ 36.747
ROAit  0.094⁄⁄⁄ 11.620
LNASSETit  0.005⁄⁄⁄ 3.881
SAME_DIRit + 1.243E-05 0.004
DIRECTit ? 8.627E-05 0.188
Y02it ? 0.002 0.751
Y03it ? 0.005⁄⁄⁄ 2.389
Y04it ? 0.005⁄⁄ 2.169
Y05it ? 0.007⁄⁄⁄ 2.935
Adjusted R2 0.1632
a RISKit is the ith ﬁrm’s default risk computed from the KMV model in year t, CEOCHANGEit represents the ith ﬁrm’s change in
their top management in year t, DEBTit is the ith ﬁrm’s debt ratio in year t, ROAit indicates the ith ﬁrm’s return on assets in year t,
LNASSETit expresses the ith ﬁrm’s log total assets in year t, SAME_DIRit is a dummy variable taking the value one if the chairman
and CEO positions are held by the same person in the ith ﬁrm in year t, DIRECTit indicates the size of the board of directors in the
ith ﬁrm in year t, Y02it, Y03it and Y04it, Y05it, are (0,1) dummy variables controlling for the effects of calendar years; if the data is
extracted from year 2002, then Y02it is 1, otherwise 0, and so on for the years 2003–2004.
b ⁄Indicates signiﬁcance at the 10% level; ⁄⁄indicates signiﬁcance at the 5% level; and ⁄⁄⁄indicates signiﬁcance at the 1% level.
Table 2
Regression results for top management turnover and ﬁrms’ prior default risk (N = 2165). RISKit1 ¼ a0 þ a1CEOCHANGEitþ
a2CEOCHANGEit1 þ a3DEBTit þ a4ROAit þ a5LNASSETit þ a6SAME DIRit þ a7DIRECTit þ a8Y02it þ a9Y03it þ a10Y04it þ a11Y05it þ eit .
Variablesa Predicted Sign Coeff.b t-statistic
Constant 0.028 1.445
CEOCHANGEit + 0.004⁄⁄ 2.005
CEOCHANGEit1 + 0.002 0.900
DEBTit + 0.078⁄⁄⁄ 24.916
ROAit  0.121⁄⁄⁄ 12.864
LNASSETit  0.005⁄⁄⁄ 3.567
SAME_DIRit + 2.978E-04 0.087
DIRECTit ? 7.786E-04 1.553
Y02it ? 0.008⁄⁄⁄ 3.063
Y03it ? 0.011⁄⁄⁄ 3.856
Y04it ? 0.014⁄⁄⁄ 5.222
Y05it ? 0.009⁄⁄⁄ 3.384
Adjusted R2 0.1789
a RISKit is the ith ﬁrm’s default risk computed from the KMV model in year t, CEOCHANGEit represents the ith ﬁrm’s change in
their top management in year t, DEBTit is the ith ﬁrm’s debt ratio in year t, ROAit indicates the ith ﬁrm’s return on assets in year t,
LNASSETit expresses the ith ﬁrm’s log total assets in year t, SAME_DIRit is a dummy variable taking the value one if the chairman
and CEO positions are held by the same person in the ith ﬁrm in year t, DIRECTit indicates the size of the board of directors in the
ith ﬁrm in year t, Y02it, Y03it and Y04it, Y05it, are (0,1) dummy variables controlling for the effects of calendar years; if the data is
extracted from year 2002, then Y02it is 1, otherwise 0, and so on for the years 2003–2004.
b ⁄Indicates signiﬁcance at the 10% level; ⁄⁄indicates signiﬁcance at the 5% level; and ⁄⁄⁄indicates signiﬁcance at the 1% level.
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the 1% level; however, the estimated coefﬁcient of CEOCHANGEit+1 is not statistically signiﬁcant. These results reveal that
after replacement of top management, the probability of ﬁrm default is lower than for ﬁrms that did not replace top
management in the previous period. Nevertheless, when ﬁrms change top management, the probability of default does
not result in an immediate decrease in the current period. This provides evidence to partially support Hypothesis 2. Further-
more, the coefﬁcient of DEBT is signiﬁcantly positive, whereas the effects of ROA and ASSET are signiﬁcantly negative. These
results are similar to those presented in Table 2.
To summarize Tables 2 and 3, we ﬁnd that the probability of default has an important inﬂuence on the turnover of top
management. When ﬁrms face a higher probability of default they have more incentive to change their top management.
Furthermore, the top managers of bankrupt ﬁrms often have difﬁculty ﬁnding other work, which provides a motive for them
to leave companies with a higher probability of default. The results in Table 3 also show that after the replacement of top
management, the probability of default is signiﬁcantly lower than for other ﬁrms. In other words, replacement of top
management can mitigate ﬁrm default risk.
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Several studies have used the Z-score to compute the default risk of ﬁrms. We therefore also adopt the Z-score as the
dependent variable to undertake robustness analysis, based on the same type of model calculated by Carcello et al. (1995)
and subsequently adopted by Carey and Simnett (2006). The results are consistent with the results presented. We also use
real default risk as the dependent variable to explore the relationship between default risk and top management turnover.
The results are consistent with those presented, thereby indicating the overall robustness of the results of this study.
As the potential problem of endogeneity between top management turnover and default risk has been recognized in
many previous studies, we adopt the generalized method of moments (GMM) approach to control for a potential endogene-
ity bias in the original regression models. The GMM, which was developed by Hansen (1982), is an appropriate method for
dealing with estimations when there is a potential endogeneity bias. The GMM methodology provides a uniﬁed estimation
and testing framework that is naturally suited to empirical problems where endogeneity and instrument validity are central
(Hayashi, 2000; Wooldridge, 2001; Baum, Schaffer and Stillman, 2003). Furthermore, GMM also provides an appropriate
econometric speciﬁcation for dealing with the endogeneity issues which we are likely to encounter when estimating the gov-
ernance/performance relationship (Arellano and Bover, 1995; Blundell and Bond, 1998). Using this methodology, our results
are again consistent with those presented.5. Conclusions
In China, a country that is changing from a socialist planned economy to a market economy, ﬁrms need top managers who
are talented and professional decision-makers who can increase ﬁrm performance and decrease risk. Accordingly, improving
top management in Chinese listed companies is very important. However, many companies in China’s listed securities mar-
ket are state-owned enterprises, which in the past have not exerted pressure on top management to increase ﬁrm perfor-
mance or decrease ﬁrm default risk. Nevertheless, since the start of economic reforms in China, top management have
increasingly had to answer to the failure of ﬁrms. The literature suggests that sub-par performance provides the board of
directors with an incentive to change top management. In China, where ﬁnancial crisis and fraud are widespread, efﬁciently
controlling the probability of ﬁrm default risk is also an important mission for top management.
However, few studies have explored the relationship between top management turnover and ﬁrm default risk. Therefore,
in our study we compute the actual probability of default as an alternative proxy to explore this relationship and our ﬁndings
complement those of prior studies. We ﬁnd that ﬁrms with higher default risk are more likely to change their top manage-
ment. The probability of default risk decreasing or increasing following a change in top management is also important. Our
results show that ﬁrms that change their top management have a lower subsequent risk of default compared to other com-
panies. In another words, replacement of top management can mitigate ﬁrm default risk.Appendix A
We use the KMV model – a model developed by the KMV Company in 1993 – to estimate and measure the default risk of
the ﬁrms used in this study. The KMV model calculates the ‘expected default frequency’ (EDF) based on the ﬁrm’s capital
structure, volatility of asset returns and current asset value in accordance with the option pricing model of Black and Scholes
(1973) and Merton (1974). This model is best applied to publicly traded companies for which the value of equity is deter-
mined by the market.
There are three steps involved in deriving the actual probability of default. First, we estimate the asset value and the vol-
atility of asset returns. Financial models usually consider the market value of assets, not the book value, since the latter rep-
resents only the historical cost of the physical assets, net of depreciation. Second, we calculate the default point. According to
the KMV model, default occurs when the asset value reaches a level somewhere between the value of total liabilities and
short-term debt. This point, which is referred to as the default point (DPT), is considered within the KMV model as the
sum of the short-term debt plus half of the long-term debt. Third, we calculate the ‘distance to default’ (DD), an index mea-
sure of default risk, which is the number of standard deviations between the mean of the distribution of the asset value and
DPT. We then scale the DD to the actual probability of default using a default database. The estimation procedure is as
follows:dVtA
VtA
¼ udt þ rAdZt ð3Þwhere VtA is the total market value of the ﬁrm’s assets at time t for China, u is the expected rate of return and rA is the vol-
atility of asset returns. Thus, we can state the above equation in accordance with the option pricing model as follows:VE ¼ VANðd1Þ  Xerf tNðd2Þ ð4Þ
d1 ¼
ln VAX
 þ rf þ rA2 t
rA
ﬃﬃ
t
p ; d2 ¼ d1  rA
ﬃﬃ
t
p
ð5Þ
88 W. Ting / China Journal of Accounting Research 4 (2011) 81–89rE ¼ VAVE Nðd1ÞrA ð6Þwhere VA is the market value of assets for ﬁrms listed on Chinese Stock Exchanges, VE is the market value of equity for the
Chinese listed company, rE represents the volatility of equity returns, X is the book value of the total debt on the balance
sheet, t represents the time to maturity of the debt, rf is the one-year risk-free rate from the central bank of China, N(d1)
expresses the hedging ratio with a cumulative probability density function, N(d2) is the probability that the market value
of assets is greater than the liability at maturity t, a cumulative density probability function.
The implied market value and volatility of assets, VA and rA, can be calculated from Eqs. (4) and (6). We also need to com-
pute the ‘distance to default’ (DD). Given that the total debt is regarded as the default point (DPT) for the ﬁrm, after being
standardized by the standard deviation of asset returns, its DD can be expressed as:DD ¼
lnðVAÞ  ln u r
2
A
2
 
t
rA
ﬃﬃ
t
p ð7ÞThe implied default risk for any period t – that is, the probability that the market value of assets will be lower than lia-
bilities at maturity – is measured in accordance with the risk-neutral method. The procedure is as follows:EDFt ¼ Pr½VtA  Xt jV0A ¼ VA¼Pr½lnVtA  lnXt ð8Þ
After being represented in compliance with the Ito Process, the market value of assets can be expressed, in logarithmic
form, as follows:lnVtA ¼ lnV0A þ u
r2A
2
 
t þ r
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T
p
e ð9Þwhere e denotes a random factor of asset returns.
We place Eq. (9) into (8) after hypothesizing that the asset returns follow a normal distribution. After arranging the re-
lated terms, we obtain the default probability EDFt, as follows:EDFt ¼ Pr½VtA  Xt jV0A ¼ VA ¼ Pr lnV0A þ u
r2A
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